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I.  Introduction
Central Eurasia is a vast arid zone that spans the 
inner region of the Eurasian continent. From ancient 
times to the early modern period the main actors in its 
history were nomadic peoples; tribes that had taken the 
initiative and prevailed over the surrounding sedentary 
people. However, from the 18th century, the nomads of 
Central Eurasia were absorbed into empires, such as 
the Russia Empire.
When we examine the historiography of Central 
Eurasian nomads, it becomes clear that great emphasis 
has been placed on the pre-modern period; however, in 
this article, modern events that occurred in the region 
will be considered. In regard to the modern history of 
the nomads who lived under the rule of the Russian 
Empire, the framework of “oppression and resistance” 
played a prominent role, as this describes the binomial 
confrontation between the nomads and the empire. 
Of course, there is no doubt that in modern Central 
Eurasia various rebellions occurred, and local nomads 
were willing participants.
However, the relationship between the Russian 
empire and nomads was not always antagonistic. 
In historical research of the Russian Empire, which 
has flourished since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
it has been argued that Russian rule had a pluralist 
character. While Russian authorities did attempt to 
patronise Russian Orthodox Christianity and the 
Russian language, they also, on the whole, pursued 
co-existence with local cultures and religions.2 
However, their motivation for pursuing this strategy 
is somewhat ambiguous; there does not appear to have 
been many positive reasons for the Russian Empire to 
wholeheartedly adopt a pluralist policy, in fact there 
were negative reasons for doing so, including the 
placing of limitations on Russian governing prowess 
and assimilative power. Central Asia is a particularly 
conspicuous example of such a phenomenon. While 
the Russian Empire may have intended to Russify 
the local populations of Central Asia, it failed to 
make substantive progress towards this goal.3 This is 
evidenced by the fact that throughout the period of 
Russian rule, the subject populations of Central Asia 
had the legal status of inorodtsy (“aliens”). Indeed, a 
significant gulf lay between Russian settlers and locals 
in terms of religion, culture, and language.
Against this backdrop of partial and incomplete 
integration, one must consider the people who operated 
between the Russian Empire and local communities. 
The role of “collaborators” during imperial rule has 
already been the subject of much attention in historical 
research on Western imperial expansion in Asia and 
Africa.4 Recent findings in relation to the history of 
the Russian Empire have shed some light on those who 
played similarly collaborative roles under Russian rule.
These local collaborators can be broadly divided 
into two groups. The first were the modern educated 
class, the so-called “intellectuals”, and the second 
were the traditional local elites. Of the two, the 
former has been researched most,5 although there has 
been a sudden increase in interest in the latter. It is an 
unmistakable fact that Russian imperial rule would not 
have been possible had it not been for the collaboration 
of such local elites. Research from this standpoint is 
making great strides; research on the settled areas of 
Central Asia is making the most progress,6 but there 
have also been interesting findings concerning the 
Article
Aspects of the Islamic Engagement of  
a Kyrgyz Tribal Chieftain in Russian Central Asia1
Tetsu Akiyama
Junior Researcher, Organization for Islamic Area Studies, Waseda University
Aspects of the Islamic Engagement of a Kyrgyz Tribal Chieftain in Russian Central Asia ｜ Akiyama　17
situation among nomads, particularly the Kazakhs.7 
However, research that attempts to conduct a more 
positive analysis of local traditional elites, such as the 
nomads of Central Asia during the period of Russian 
imperial rule, remains inadequate.
In view of this inadequacy, this article will focus 
on the chieftains of the Kyrgyz8 nomads, who inhabited 
the highland areas of the Tian Shan Mountains. During 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the intellectuals 
among the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks gradually 
asserted themselves as the leaders of their respective 
people. By comparison, the appearance of similar 
Kyrgyz intellectuals occurred much later.9 Until the 
early 20th century, chieftains of the tribes—known as 
manaps10—continued to maintain a strong presence as 
the substantive leaders of Kyrgyz society.
In my last articles11, I examined the conditions 
that enabled manaps to thrive under direct Russian rule 
by investigating the quality of Russian governance. 
From the beginning of Russia’s conquest of Central 
Asia, Russian colonial military authorities12 consistently 
considered manaps to be impediments to colonial rule. 
However, they found themselves unable to undermine 
their power and so, conversely, manaps proved useful 
in supplementing the weaknesses in Russian rule. 
However, this does not mean that Russian military 
authorities were pro-actively recruiting, protecting, 
or nurturing manaps as collaborators. Rather, they 
were in largely “passively dependent” on manaps in 
that they were more or less obliged to accommodate 
them. Consequently, the manaps were incompletely 
integrated into the Russian Empire. While evidence 
has revealed the proximity of manaps and Russian 
military authorities, a closer examination shows a deep 
gulf between the two groups. For Russian military 
authorities, manaps remained “close, yet far”.
Building on my previous investigation into the 
policy of the Russian Empire toward the manaps, this 
article aims to examine the activities and attitudes of 
manaps under the Russian rule. In order to achieve the 
aim of this article, focus will be placed on one particular 
manap, Shabdan Jantay uulu (1840–1912). As can be 
seen from his dates of birth and death, Shabdan lived 
during the military expansion of the Russian Empire 
into Central Asia. During his lifetime, Shabdan was 
famous as a prominent collaborator with the Russian 
Empire. Indeed, he participated in the empire’s military 
campaigns in Central Asia, including the conquest of 
the Khanate of Khokand and, as a result, was granted 
the military title of Voiskovoi Starshina (Lieutenant 
Colonel) in 1883.
Unusually for nomads, who generally leave few 
written texts, there is a relatively large number of 
historical materials on Shabdan, many of which are 
official documents composed by the Russian colonial 
military authorities. While these materials reflect the 
policy of the Russian Empire toward Shabdan, they also 
include rich, significant information that enables us to 
understand his activities under Russian rule beyond the 
dichotomy between himself and Russia. Indeed, while 
he held Russian military status, he also remained aware 
of the traditional values of Central Eurasian nomads 
and emphasized his authority as a baatyr (hero)13 
throughout his life.
In addition to his nomadic heritage, we must 
not forget his connection with Islam. Although recent 
studies on the social history of Russian Central Asia 
have shed light on the spread of Islam in the sedentary 
Fig.1 Shabdan with his family (in the early 20th century)
(Tsentral’nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Kinofotofonodokumentov Kyrgyzskoi 
Respubliki [TsGA KFFD KR], no.0-29766)
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region,14 thus far investigation on the dissemination 
of Islam among nomads has been insufficient.15 Of 
course, there is no doubt that, in comparison with 
sedentary people, the spread of Islam among nomads 
was relatively small; however, the Islamic revival that 
originated with the Tatars of the Volga-Ural region 
during the latter half of the 19th century reached not 
only the sedentary peoples of Central Asia, but also the 
nomads, including the Kyrgyz.
In fact, among the Kyrgyz of Semirech ’e, 
Shabdan functioned as a representative of the new 
Islamic movement. While he managed to emphasize his 
authority as a baatyr throughout his life, as mentioned 
above, he was also a devout believer in Islam. According 
to the ethnographical materials that were collected by 
S. M. Abramzon in the early 1920s, Shabdan strictly 
observed Islamic practices. He would rise before dawn 
in order to take a bath and to perform morning prayers. 
On one occasion, a strong earthquake occurred while he 
was attending a prayer service in a mosque. Although 
all of the other people in the mosque immediately left, 
Shabdan remained and completed his prayers.16 These 
anecdotes show not only that Shabdan as an individual 
was a devout Muslim, but also that he managed to 
promote his image as a devout Muslim to the local 
society.
Consequently, this article will examine Shabdan’s 
engagement with Islam, mainly during the early 20th 
century. The materials used for this article include not 
only the official documents of the Russian colonial 
military authorities, which are currently stored in the 
national archives of Kazakhstan and Russia, but also 
books and manuscripts written by Kyrgyz people as well 
as Shabdan’s tombstone and private archive, which was 
bequeathed to his descendants. To supplement these 
sources, I also refer to official gazettes, newspapers, 
and magazines that were published during the period 
in question. 
II.  Shabdan as a Murid 
The Kyrgyz embraced Islam in the 16th century. 
It is well known that they clearly identified themselves 
as Muslim because they engaged in a long series of 
confrontations with non-Muslims, including the 
Qalmaq.17 On the other hand, in reality, the form of 
Islam they adhered to was unique as it was influenced 
by pre-Islamic characteristics, including local customs 
and shamanism.18 In regard to this point, ethnographer 
Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, a Kazakh scholar who visited 
the Kyrgyz in the middle of the 19th century, stated 
the following: “…[the Kyrgyz] identify themselves 
as Muslim despite the fact that they don’t know the 
doctrine of Islam. Their every ritual preserves the 
character of Shamanism. […] Among them there are 
few who understand the fundamental principles [of 
Islam] […] or who summon the faithful five times a 
day and observe a fast”.19 
As can be expected, the unique characteristics 
of their form of Islam influenced the tribal chieftains 
or manaps. In this regard, Valikhanov also related the 
following account: When Kazakh chieftains asked 
Kyrgyz manaps the name of the prophet, “after serious 
thought, they were unable to answer”.20 In other 
words, they did not know the name of Muhammad. 
During the mid-19th century the activities of manaps 
were influenced by Shamanistic aspects. For instance, 
according to a folktale, Umid Ali, a manap-baatyr of the 
Sarybagysh tribe, would kill war prisoners in order to 
drain their blood and offer them as sacrifices.21 Indeed, 
he was called bakhshi, a title that was granted to Shaman 
priests.22 A similar connection with shamanism can also 
be found in the case of a manap-baatyr named Jantay, 
who was Shabdan’s father. According to an elegy for 
Jantay, which was recorded by a famous Turkologist, V. 
Radlov, in 1869: “…when Jantay was alive, […] without 
crossing it, he was used to roughen a river (kechpei suunï 
tolkutkan) to scare the enemy…”.23 From this passage, 
it can be guessed that Jantay was believed to be able to 
perform yada, a shamanistic form of magical weather 
control.
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Although an element of Shamanism remained 
noticeable among the Kyrgyz, their Islamization 
proceeded slowly but surely. Sufism played an important 
role in this process. As previous research has shown, 
ishans (Sufi masters) of the Naqshbandi order, which 
was based in the sedentary areas of Central Asia, 
including the Feraghan valley, travelled into the Tian 
Shan Mountains to recruit murid (followers) from 
among the Kyrgyz.24
In fact, Shabdan remained a murid throughout 
his life, and evidence of this can be found in various 
materials. For example, in a report sent to the military 
governor of Semirech’e oblast in 1897, A. Talyzin, a 
Pishpek uezd commander, wrote: “Shabdan has come 
to pay more respect to ishans and khojas and he collects 
large numbers of cattle from ordinary people in order 
to make contributions to them”.25 According to the 
ethnographical materials that were collected by S. M. 
Abramzon during the early 1920s, Shabdan surrounded 
himself with many ishans for a number of years.26 In this 
regard, a passage from Shabdan’s obituary in the local 
official newspaper of Semirech’e oblast is interesting; 
it reads: “…around Shabdan there were dozens of poor 
and they were fed by him”.27 In this passage, “dozens of 
poor” refers to ishans, who disguised themselves as poor 
people, which can be proven by the following passage 
from Abramzon: “the poor people, who were fed by 
Shabdan, used to travel into villages of nomads in order 
to praise the great undertakings of Muhammad and 
Shabdan”.28
III.  From Baatyr to Baatyr Hajji
In addition to this traditional style of Islam based 
on Sufism, Shabdan’s engagement with Islam began to 
assume a more visible character. Clear evidence of this 
is the fact that Shabdan ordered the construction of 
a mosque at the beginning of the 20th century. [Fig.2] 
In this regard, we must refer to a description of 
Islam among the Kyrgyz that was written by the first 
uezd commander, G. Zagryazhskii, in the final months 
of 1860. It reads as follows: “…the Kyrgyz are totally 
indifferent to mosques. They believe that mosques 
belong to Sarts [i.e., the sedentary people of Turkestan] 
and they never find any value in mosques”.29 Thus, it is 
clear that over the half-century period under Russian 
rule, the Kyrgyz version of Islam had certainly begun 
to change. 
Besides the construction of mosques, we must not 
Fig.2 Shabdan’s mosque 
(TsGA KFFD KR, no.2-5293)
Fig.3 A sample of passport issued for hajj. 
(TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.2463, l.338)
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forget hajj, or pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. It is 
well known that from the latter half of the 19th century 
many pilgrims from remote areas of the Islamic world, 
such as the Muslims of Russian Central Asia, began to 
make hajj, availing themselves of improved transport 
infrastructure such as steamships and railways. 
According to the archive documents of the colonial 
military authority of Semirech’e oblast, between 1902 
and 1906 there was an average of 50 passports issued 
annually in Pishpek uezd for hajj.30 Shabdan himself 
embarked on hajj from December 1904 to May 1905.
It is well known that those who returned from 
hajj were respected and given the honorif ic title 
hajji,31 which also applied to Shabdan. In fact, when 
we examine an impression of his seal attached to a 
document from 1905, it reads “Shabdan hajji Jantay”.32 
[Fig.4] Another example is a tombstone erected after 
his death in 1912, in which his genealogy and great 
deeds are engraved. [Fig.6] It is noteworthy that on 
this tombstone he is called baatyr hajji, in contrast to 
his descendants, who are called baatyr. Thus, it can be 
supposed that the new title, baatyr hajji, was created 
by adding the new Islamic honorific title, hajji, to the 
existing nomadic one, baatyr. Of course, we cannot be 
certain of the popularity or importance of this new title; 
however, if we consider the fact that it can be found in 
other contemporary materials,33 it seems clear that it 
was acknowledged in local society to a certain extent.
What did the change in title from baatyr to 
baatyr hajji mean for Shabdan? As Russian colonial 
military authority over the region meant that Shabdan 
could no longer act as a nomadic hero, the new Islamic 
element must have appeared a very attractive means of 
reinforcing his traditional authority as baatyr. In relation 
to this, it is interesting that Shabdan recommended 
that others embark on hajj. Most remarkably, he 
recommended it not only to his relatives, but also to 
his bodyguards, who were known as jigit34. In fact, 
when Shabdan made his hajj, he was accompanied 
by one of his jigit, Bayake,35 who had been serving 
Shabdan since his youth; in other words, his right-
hand man. Fig.7 shows one of the privately-owned 
Fig.4 An impression of Shabdan’s seal (1905) 
(TsGA RK, f.44, op.1, d.8815, l.10)
Fig.5 Shabdan in ihram (TsGA KFFD KR, no.0-60978)
Fig.6 Tombstone of Shabdan
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documents that have been bequeathed to Shabdan’s 
descendants.36 It appears to be an illustrated plan of 
Mecca and Medina. Although its origins are unclear, 
it is supposed that Shabdan brought it on his hajj. 
In the lower part of this plan we can find the names 
“Bayake hajji Kuntughan” and “Shabdan baatyr hajji 
Jantay”. If we take into account that the nomadic hero, 
baatyr, and his bodyguards, jigit, formed the core of 
Kyrgyz nomadic societies’ military organizations and 
represented the traditional values of nomads in Central 
Eurasia, this illustration appears to be genuine evidence 
of the circumstances under which they began to adopt 
Islamic authority.
However, Shabdan was not the only manap to 
make hajj. As a colonial military official highlighted 
in his report to the military governor of Semirech’e 
in 1910, hajj become popular among other manaps 
and it was a convenient way for them to maintain 
and strengthen their authority as tribal chieftains; 
specifically, he stated: “…in order to keep their influence 
among the populace, they began to rely on a remarkable 
method. These days, the number of people who make 
hajj has increased drastically. Having returned from 
hajj, they call themselves hajji and assume a special 
position”.37 In fact, the manaps managed to take 
advantage of the Kyrgyz adoption of Islamic, including 
hajj. According to the text of a prigovor (resolution) 
that was seized by the Russian colonial military 
authority in 1911, the manaps of the main Kyrgyz tribes 
appointed individuals to collect contributions from 
each tribe in order to allow the manaps to construct 
their own residences in Mecca and Medina. As part 
of this process, a son of Shabdan, Aman Shabdanov, 
was responsible for collecting donations in the areas 
belonging to the Sarybagysh and Sayak tribes.38 
In parallel with the attempt to seek a new source 
of authority through hajj, it was natural for the manaps 
to attempt to identify themselves in the expanse of 
the Islamic world, beyond not only Central Asia, but 
also the Russian Empire. In this regard, an episode 
from a biography of Shabdan written by another of his 
sons, Kamal Shabdanov, is interesting. According to 
this report, when Shabdan made hajj he donated 2000 
roubles to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire for the 
construction of the Hejaz Railway. In return, he was 
rewarded with a certificate and a gold medal, which 
he wore on his kaftan.39 While this does not mean 
that there was a special political relationship between 
Shabdan and the Ottoman Empire, it can be said that 
he managed to distinguish himself in the Sunni Islamic 
world, which was led by the Ottoman Empire at the 
time.
Fig.7 An illustrated plan of Mecca and Medina.
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IV.  Shabdan as a Representative of Islam
As seen above, Shabdan used Islam to reinforce 
his authority as a tribal chieftain. On the other hand, 
he also attempted to play the role of a representative of 
Islam in his local society, beyond the traditional level 
of a tribal leader, which can be clearly seen from his 
activities after the 1905 Russian Revolution.
As previous studies have highlighted, the 1905 
Russian Revolution, which originated in St. Petersburg, 
also reached Central Asia. For instance, in July 1905 
an assembly was held in the city of Semipalatinsk 
on the Kazakh steppe to debate the policies of 
the tsarist government, including topics such as 
religion, Russification, colonization, and education.40 
Concurrently, in Semirech’e oblast Shabdan attempted 
to send a petition to the central tsarist government. It 
is interesting to note that he prefaced the petition with 
the following statement: “Lieutenant Colonel Shabdan 
Dzhantaev [sends this petition] as a representative of 
the Muslim people, including kara-kirgiz [i.e., the 
Kyrgyz] of the Turkestan region and kirgiz-kaisak 
[i.e., the Kazakhs] of Semirech’e oblast…”.41 From 
this passage, it is clear that Shabdan was emphasizing 
his identity as a Muslim, which was reflected in the 
contents of the petition. Indeed, in the petition Shabdan 
requested the establishment of a Dukhovnoe sobranie 
(Muslim spiritual directorate) for the Kyrgyz of the 
Turkestan region and the Kazakhs of Semirech’e oblast 
and also requested that various matters be entrusted to 
the Dukhovnoe sobranie, including making judgements 
on legal disputes concerning marriage, family, and 
inheritance, the management of clergymen (mufti, qadi, 
imams), the granting of approval for the construction of 
mosques, the establishment of educational institutions 
such as Maktab and Madrasa, and the appointment and 
dismissal of teachers.42 
Of course, it remains unclear to what extent 
the contents of the petition reflected the intentions of 
Shabdan, because it seems possible that it was written 
under the influence of the Tatar Jadids, or Muslim 
modernist reformers, with whom Shabdan had a 
relationship, as will be mentioned later. At any rate, 
it is certain that Shabdan acknowledged himself as a 
representative of Islam and that he was regarded as such 
in his local society. Above all, we can find evidence 
of Shabdan’s Islamic orientation by examining his 
engagement in education. Indeed, in the petition 
he required that Islamic education be introduced 
in gymnasiums for Muslim students. In this way, 
by requesting the introduction of Islamic education 
into Russian schools, he managed to help develop 
Islamic education himself. As mentioned before, he 
was involved in the Muslim modernist movement, 
or Jadidism. As is commonly known, this movement 
aimed to introduce a modern style of education. It had 
originated from the Tatars of the Volga-Ural region, 
but by the beginning of the 20th century it had begun 
to extend along the commercial network of Tatars 
into Central Asia, including the area of inhabited by 
the Kyrgyz. Regarding the arrival of this movement, 
‘Uthmān‘Alī Sïdïkov wrote as follows: “…from 1901 
to 1902 an aged man named Zakir Wahab came to 
Tokmak from the city of Toroitsk. At that time the 
number of students [who wanted to learn from the man] 
so increased that our tribesman, named Chavokov, 
ordered the children not seek education in Tokmak and 
began to evict the children from the city. However, 
thanks to the petition of Shabdan and the efforts of 
Zakir the children were not punished. From year to 
year the number of students increased. […] There were 
those who went to the city of Ufa to enter the Galie 
madrasa, and there were those who invited teachers 
from the large cities…”.43 From this statement it seems 
obvious that Shabdan sympathized with the educational 
movement of Zakir, who appears to have been a Tatar 
Jadid. Indeed, according to the ethnographical materials 
that were collected by S. M. Abramzon during the 
early 1920s, Shabdan invited Tatar imams to his local 
area and, furthermore, one of his sons, Khisametdin 
Shabdanov, established a school that adhered to the 
Jadidist style and invited Tatar teachers from Kazan to 
teach there.44
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V. Dilemmas Concerning Shabdan’s 
Engagement with Islam 
How did the Russian colonial military authority 
attempt to address Shabdan’s strengthened relationship 
with Islam? As can be seen above, the Russian colonial 
military authority was clearly aware of Shabdan’s 
engagement with Islam. Among the Russian colonial 
military officials, there were those who regarded it 
as dangerous and wished to prevent its development; 
one such f igure was S. M. Dukhovskoi, who was 
appointed Governor-General of Turkestan after the 
Andijan uprising of 1898. Dukhovskoi was famous for 
fostering a sense of crisis in regard to the threat of “pan-
Islamism”, which included the Islamization of nomads 
in the Turkestan region.45 Having heard that Shabdan 
was attempting to construct a mosque, Dukhovskoi gave 
orders to the military governor of Semirech’e oblast to 
prevent its construction.46
However, while it is certain that there were those 
who wished to suppress Shabdan’s engagement with 
Islam, these were exceptional cases. On the contrary, the 
Russian colonial military authority generally regarded 
the manaps, including Shabdan, not as members of the 
“pan-Islamic” power, which was hostile and dangerous 
to Russian rule, but rather as breakwaters that could 
prevent “pan-Islamism” from penetrating into local 
society. In this regard, a report from 1909 by the chief 
of the police of Tokmak district is interesting; it reads: 
“…the influence of local clergymen is totally dependent 
on the manaps. The local mullahs are right-hand men of 
the manaps and without their influence they could not 
occupy their present position. They are messengers of 
the views of the manaps and their personal and social 
interests. For this reason, the local mullahs can never 
gain political influence over the local population”.47
The sense of crisis among the Russian colonial 
military authority in relation to the threat of “pan-
Islamism” was closely connected with the ongoing 
policy of planting Russian peasants in the nomadic areas 
of Central Asia, especially Semirech’e oblast. In order 
to enforce this policy, it was required to confiscate land 
from local nomads, which, the Russian colonial military 
authority feared, could lead to an uprising instigated by 
the “pan-Islamic” movement.48 
In this regard, it is necessary to review the matter 
of the special allocation of land to Shabdan. In order 
to dissuade the nomads from engaging in resistance 
to the confiscation of their lands, the Russian colonial 
military authority, including the Governor-General 
of Turkestan, A. V. Samsonov, managed to placate 
Shabdan by allocating land to him. On the other hand, 
the central tsarist government, including the Glavnoe 
upravlenie zemleustroistva i zemledeliya (the Main 
Directorate for land use and cultivation), disagreed 
with such special treatment. In order to address this 
situation, in July 1909 Samsonov sent a letter to A. V. 
Krivoshein, the director of the Main Directorate for 
land use and cultivation. In the final section of the 
letter, Samsonov stated: “…as far as we are short of 
a police force, Shabdan Dzhantaev is an extremely 
desirable counterforce to fight against the agitation of 
the Kazan-Tatars”.49 Of course, Samsonov must have 
understood Shabdan’s relationship with Islam, including 
his connection with Tatar Jadids. Nevertheless, he did 
not consider him an enemy that should be defeated. 
On the contrary, he managed to position Shabdan as 
an able collaborator in the fight against “pan-Islamism”. 
In this way, the matter of the special allocation 
of land to Shabdan can be contextualized not only as 
a measure to prevent the resistance of nomads, but 
also as part of the “fight against the pan-Islamism”. 
Concurrently, this matter seems to clearly indicate the 
dilemma of the Russian colonial military authority. 
That is to say, the fear of unrest meant that the Russian 
colonial military authority was obliged to materially 
support Shabdan. 
In this regard, we must highlight that Shabdan’s 
relationship with Islam was encouraged by the Russians 
themselves. As is well known, the construction of 
railroads in Central Asia did not so much help to 
incorporate local people into the central part of the 
empire as encourage them to make hajj and to connect 
with the Islamic world, Shabdan also used the railroad 
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when he made hajj. 
In addition, we must not forget that Shabdan 
participated in the Russian Empire’s military campaign 
in Central Asia, which included the conquest of the 
Khanate of Khokand and, as a result, he was granted the 
military title of Voiskovoi Starshina in 1883. In order to 
develop his Islamic relationship, including constructing 
mosques and making hajj, a great deal of money was 
required. How Shabdan raised funds for his engagement 
with Islam remains uncertain, but the annuity that was 
granted to holders of the title Voiskovoi Starshina may 
have contributed. Furthermore, it is interesting to note 
that from the late 19th century into the early 20th century 
Shabdan attempted to acquire as much financial aid 
from the Russian Empire as possible by emphasizing 
his past military exploits. In fact, at the end of the 
19th century he demanded a raise in his pension.50 In 
addition, in 1903 he demanded that for the voennyi 
orden (a military decoration) he was awarded in 1876, 
which he received for his participation in the Fergana 
expedition, the Glavnyi department gosudarstvennogo 
kaznacheistva (the National treasury) pay him the 
corresponding pension for 26 years.51 
Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that the 
honorific title baatyr hajji was a by-product of the 
Russian Empire’s military conquest and rule of Central 
Asia. Despite this, the question of whether Shabdan’s 
collaboration with the Russian rulers impeded his 
relationship with Islam remains. Above all, we cannot 
overlook the fact that Shabdan participated in the 
Fergana expedition during the 1870s and helped the 
Russian army conquer the Khanate of Khokand, which 
means that, directly or indirectly, he was involved in 
the slaughter of local Muslims under the orders of the 
Russian general M. D. Skovelev. Of course, it is unclear 
how Shabdan himself regarded his participation in the 
expedition at that time. It is possible that, similar to the 
contemporary intelligentsias of Turkestan, he justified 
it using the logic that “even if he is a non-Muslim, he 
is better than a Muslim tyrant”.52 It also seems possible 
that he was driven by the local nomadic sense of justice 
to protect tribesmen from the Khanate of Khokand. 
However, by at least the beginning of the 20th 
century Shabdan’s participation in the slaughter of 
local Muslims must have cast a dark shadow on his 
relationship with Islam. Although there appears to be 
no extant contemporary materials on this matter, in the 
biography of Shabdan written by Kamal Shabdanov we 
can find a suggestive passage in regard to Shabdan’s 
consideration of this problem: “…for those who obeyed 
Russia anew, Shabdan endeavoured to support them as 
much as possible and never did them harm. When the 
city of Namangan was captured, [the Russian General 
Skovelev] ordered the shooting of 35 local Muslims, 
including khojas, mullahs, and aksakals. When Shabdan 
baatyr appealed to Skovelev, the latter rescinded the 
order and released them”.53 As can be seen from this 
passage, Shabdan was depicted not as a slaughterer, but 
as a saviour of Muslims. It is not clear whether such 
anecdotes were prevalent during his lifetime; however, 
if we take into account that the biography was written 
by his own son, it is likely that Shabdan managed 
to employ this logic to make his participation in the 
Russian expedition compatible with his relationship 
with Islam. At any rate, it is certain that Shabdan 
experienced emotional turmoil in regard to his 
engagement with Islam.
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